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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to show how the evolution of financial technology affects the 
welfare in the economy. On the empirical side, I construct a time series for the costs of 
financial services, and I find that the evolution shows a decreasing trend in the period 
analyzed. In addition, the new statistical tool goes a long way to explaining US M1 
money demand. I find that the financial costs became significantly lower after major 
financial innovation events had taken place. Then I study how financial innovation, 
understood as a decrease in portfolio adjustment costs, affects macro variables and 
welfare.  
 
JEL Codes: E3, E4, E5. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The traditional monetary theory that links interest rates, money supply and inflation rate 
has been called into question over the last 30 years. One explanation for this is the large 
increase in technology in financial markets. In fact, over these past decades, financial 
markets have been characterized by a surge in technology
1
, with the introduction of new 
products and instruments
2
 by banks and in financial markets with, ATMs, venture 
capital, credit cards, interest rate swaps, CDS, e-banking and electronic payments. 
Technology and the structure of the financial system are constantly changing, affecting 
the way in which money is held. 
Empirical evidence shows that financial innovations have an impact on the money 
demand function, a process that started in the 1970s.  This problem with the stability of 
money demand began in the 1970s with Goldfeld (1973). He found that a traditional 
money demand equation enabled an accurate characterization of quarterly U.S. data 
during the period 1952-1972. As a result of this work, the    money demand function 
became the conventional money demand function used by policy makers. However, 
Goldfeld (1976), extends the sample period to 1976 and reports a significant reduction 
in the performance of the money demand equation. This phenomenon of instability in 
the money demand function was labeled as the “case of missing money” and the most 
commonly accepted explanation for this is that money demand declined as the result of 
financial innovations. After this, as far as the importance of the effects of financial 
innovation on understanding the relation between money demand, income and interest 
                                                 
1
  Lerner and Tufano (2011) provide useful reviews of the literature about financial innovation.  
2
 For a longer description of new financial instruments see Foster et al. (2011). 
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rate elasticity is concerned, a large volume of research has been undertaken and several 
proxies have been used in order to capture these effects. 
The research on instability of money demand has followed several directions. One 
direction is that financial innovations have to some degree blurred the distinctions 
between the different components of the monetary aggregates to some degree. As a 
consequence, there has been a discussion about whether M1 is the best aggregate to use 
in the study of money demand. For instance, Teles and Zhou (2005) argued that M1 is 
the relevant measure of money since the major technological developments that have 
taken place in financial markets. They focused on a monetary aggregate Money Zero 
Maturity (MZM)
3
, which measures balances available immediately for transactions at 
zero cost. 
Another implication for the study of money demand is that financial innovation affects 
both the extensive margin (the decision whether to hold interest-earning assets) and the 
intensive margin (the decision on how to allocate wealth between money and interest-
earning assets). Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) reported that the fixed costs of 
adopting financial innovation introduce frictions into the participation decision as a way 
of explaining the reason why only 41 percent of US agents in 1989 have an interest 
bearing banking account. In addition, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) reports that these costs, 
faced by households in rebalancing a portfolio, motivate the holding of money and less 
participation in the financial markets.  
In a model with cash-in-advance constraints faced by households, these latter seek to 
                                                 
3
 Federal Reserve Bank defined MZM as M2 less small-denomination time deposits plus money funds. 
 
Página 8 de 45 
hold only money enough to liquidate their consumption expenses at a constant rate over 
some interval of time and hold the remaining wealth in the form of non-monetary assets. 
As households need to visit financial markets to transfer wealth from the bonds to 
money and pay a real cost to make these transfer, it is costly for them to go to the 
financial markets to adjust the composition of portfolio, but, at the same time, it is also 
costly to hold money because it is an asset with no earned interest. As documented by 
Edmond and Weill (2008), this (high) cost is normally required in models of market 
segmentation and implies that households visit financial markets very low infrequently. 
I will give special attention to the role of these financial costs (γ). My interpretation for 
γ will be the real costs of visit financial markets to exchange assets with less liquidity 
for money - for instance, costs associated with time spent for information meeting, 
decision making, negotiation and communication or price of financial intermediation. 
As suggested by Reynard (2004), a stable money demand can be obtained by a 
decreasing γ combined with increasing financial market participation. However, as the 
components of γ are difficult to account for, the analysis of monetary models in 
literature is simplified by making them constant. 
The first aim of this Dissertation is to verify if γ has been lower over the last century. To 
analyze the previous point, I explain it through a general equilibrium model with 
calibration of parameters at steady state values and construct the time series for γ.  
Concerning the choice of a model, I construct a Baumol-Tobin model with market 
segmentation, similar to the model developed by Silva (2012). In the model households 
can choose freely the timing for their use of financial services, and  , which appears in 
budget constraint of households, influences this choice, and, thus, the money demand. 
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Because the model has been constructed to study the long-run money demand when the 
economy is at steady state, the series constructed can be seen as a proxy of the real 
values of  . I found that, in general,   has followed a decreasing trend, and this 
evolution goes a long way to explain the aggregate money demand over the century, 
with elasticity of 1/2, and with the interest rate elasticity of money demand of –1/2. 
I also confirm that the decreasing of   is higher after major financial innovations and 
financial regulations have been introduced. Thus, a reduction of   in the model can be a 
good proxy in order to catch developments in the US financial sector.  
Finally, I also study how financial innovation, understood as a decrease in  , affects 
macro variables and welfare. For this, I made an experiment with the model and I find 
that, because markets are segmented, a reduction in   is beneficial for welfare because it 
more than offsets the welfare costs of higher interest rates.  
The structure of this paper will be organized in the following way: In Section 2, I 
introduce the model used in this study, explaining the behavior of the agents in the 
model (households, firms, and the government) and defining the competitive 
equilibrium and steady state of the model. In Section 3, I explain the experiment that I 
use to create a   time series and I also present my money demand specification, in order 
to explain the U.S. money income ratio. In Section 4, I introduce the social welfare 
definition and study the welfare effects of the evolution of   a proxy for financial 
development. Finally, in Section 5, I present my conclusions. 
 
 
Página 10 de 45 
2. Model 
 
Typically in the standard macro models, the moments at which households can readjust 
their portfolios are exogenous. I follow a general equilibrium model where the markets 
are endogenously and households manage money holdings by solving a Baumol (1952) 
and Tobin (1956) problem of money as inventory segmented. Time is continuous and 
denoted by   [   ).  
At any moment, there are markets for assets, consumption goods, and labor. The 
markets for assets and the market for consumption goods are physically separated. 
There are two assets: money and nominal bonds. As in Alvarez et al. (2002, 2009) 
households owns two financial accounts, a brokerage account and a bank account. They 
choose how often to transfer funds deposited in the account at the investment bank into 
the money in commercial bank account. For make this transfer is involved a financial 
costs  . As result, households accumulate bonds for a certain time and visit infrequently 
the bond market as in the models of Grossman and Weis (1983), Rotemberg (1984) and 
Alvarez, Atekson and Edmond (2009).  
The model also can be seen as standard cash in advance model with decision on 
capital and labor like Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Cooley (1995). I follow closer the 
model of Silva (2012). The difference between the model of Silva (2012) to the others 
referred above is that the decision on timing to visit financial markets, that is 
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2.1. Firms 
 
At time t, individual firm   hires labor      ) and capital      ) to produce the 
consumption goods with a Cobb-Douglas technology. With the aggregate capital    ) 
and the aggregate labor    ), the production function    ) is given by: 
    )      )    )    (1) 
where    ) is the output produced by firms,   is the level of general technology taken 
as given by firms and a parameter         ) is capital income share of total income. The 
problem of perfectly competitive firms is choice the optimal mix of aggregate capital 
and aggregate labor to maximize the following profit function  




where    ) is the price of consumption good produced by firms,    ) is the nominal 
wage received by the worker and   
  is the real rental price of capital. From the first 
order conditions, profit maximization implies that firms hire capital and labor to equate 
the rental rates to the respective marginal products, i.e., at   [  ) the demand for 
labor and the demand for capital are, respectively, given by:  
 
   )      )  (
   )





    )     (
   )
   )
)
     )
 (3) 
Assuming perfect mobility of production factors implies that    ) and     ) are the 
same for all firms.  
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2.2. Government 
 
At moment  , government issues nominal bonds,     ), that pay a nominal interest rate 
   ) and prints money,     ), makes consumption expenditures    ) and receives a 
Lump-sum tax    ) paid by the households4. The financial responsibility is given by 
total public debt     )      )      ).  
Let    )    ∫    ) 
 
   denotes the price at time zero of a bond that pays one dollar at 
time  . At moment    , for very small  , the financial responsibility is given by total 
public debt, 
      )        )        )      )     )    )     )   )     )   ). 
At moment       
       )        )     )      )       )   )       )   ). 
By multiplying both sides of      constraint by     ) and add all of them, the present 
value of all budget constraint: 
∑       ) )        ) )
 
   
)         ) )      )       )
 ∑    )   )      )        ) )     )    )     ))
 
   
 
Because government cannot accumulate debt infinitively, imposing the No Ponzi 
Games condition,    
   
    )       )   , then 
                                                 
4
  In General case we can consider the revenues from tax capital and labor.  
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∑       ) )        ) )
 
   
)         ) )
 ∑    )   )      )        ) )     )    )     ))
 
   
 
Due to the government be continuously in the asset markets exchanging bonds for 
money, and   is very small,    , thus the present value of intertemporal budget 
constraint of government is given by: 
   




 where   
    
    
  is the initial public debt of government. Dividing both sides by 
   )     
  , where   is the inflation rate, we have the budget constraint of 
government in real terms: 
   




where   
    
     ), and    )      )    ). 
2.3. Households 
 
There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived households with preferences over consumption 
and leisure. Each household sells hours of labor      ) and rents capital      ), to the 
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firms. The problem is written assuming both the labor income,    )   )     ), and the 
rental income,     )   )     ) are deposited in brokerage account5.   
Household   [   ] decides on consumption      ), labor supply      ), capital      ), 
the dates when transfers to the bank are made     ), money holdings in the bank account 
     ) and bond holdings in the brokerage account      ). She has an initial 
endowment of wealth divided between initial monetary assets     ) in the bank 
account, initial bonds     ) in the brokerage account and the initial dividends from 
rents capital to the firms in the brokerage account,       ).  The holding period 
between any two consecutive transfer times is the interval      )       )), for   
     . 
In order to describe de model, it will be used the notation   (    )  ) for denotes the 
position of variable x just before the transfer time at     ), and  
 (    )  ) for denote 
the position at transfer time     ). The net transfer from the brokerage account to the 
bank account is given by        )  )  
      )  ), where  
 (    )  )  
         )       )      ) and  
 (    )  )           )       )      ) shows, 
respectively, the monetary assets holding just after and before a transfer at       ). 
The definitions of dynamic of bonds holding in brokerage account and quantities of 
capital are similar. When a household   readjust portfolio at     ),       , it face a 
constraint on the brokerage account which imposes the portfolio chosen plus costs of 
adjustment  (    ))  must be equal or smaller to the current wealth, i.e.,  
                                                 
5
 Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas (2010) write the problem of households assuming that firms 
pays 60% of total income received from households in money. Silva (2012), in the model without 
decision in capital and labor by households, compare the money demand with the assumption of these 
works, and with the assumption that all income is paid in non-monetary assets.  
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  (    )  )   
 (    )  )   (    )) 
 (    )  )   (    )) 
   (    )  )   
 (    )  )   (    ))  
 (    )  ) 
During holding periods   {[    )       ))}   
 
, bonds and capital follow respectively 
 ̇    )     )     )     )   )     )     )   ) and  ̇  )        )   )     ). 
With this, and multiplying the restriction in each holding period by  (      ))  
 ∫    )  
      )
 , where  (      ))  denotes the price in     of a bond which pays one 
dollar in       ), substituting the restriction recursively for the different holdings period 
constraint, and after sum up all them we have 
∑  (    )) [ 
 (    )  )   
 (    )  )   (  ) 
 (    )  )   (  ) ]
 
    
∑  (    ))
 
    
 (  )      )        )  ∫    )
 
 
   )   )     )   




Using the Non Ponzi Games conditions,            ) 
    )    and 
           )    ) 
    )   , the present value of intertemporal budget constraint 
becomes: 
∑  (    )) [ 
 (    )  )   (    )) ]
 
    ∑  (    ))
 
    
 (    )  )      )  
      )  ∫    )
 
 
   )   )     )   ∫    )   )  
 
 
         (5) 
The restrictions (5) states that the present value of money transfers and transfers fees 
must be less or equal to the present value of deposits in the brokerage account, including  
initials holdings of bonds and income from capital and labor. Households also have a 
cash-in-advance constraint with varying holding periods      )       )), which imposes 
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that households need enough money on their bank account to be able to visit goods 
markets during the whole holding period,  ̇    )      )     )           )   
     , The cash in advance constraints that household   faces can be written as: 
   (    )  )  ∫    )     )  
      )
    )
 (6) 
In this economy without uncertainty is never optimal to set        )       , 
because it means that the agents maintained money holdings in the bank, during the 
holding period      )       )) without receiving interest. The agent is always better off 
if transfer money from their brokerage account to their bank account and reducing the 
amount transferred at    for transactions during the holding period until  
      )   . 
However, as    is given by households, it can still be the case that  
      )   , for 
      
The household   take a King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) utility function6: 












Where   is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution,     is the relative risk aversion 
and     is the relative preference parameter for leisure      )         ). 
Preferences are a function of consumption goods and labor, the financial costs do not 
enter directly in utility function. At    , given prices and            ), agents 
make their decisions in choice the vector   {     )      )       )       )} by 
solving the following problem: 
                                                 
6
 King et. al (1988) shows that this kind of preferences have properties consistent with steady state 
equilibrium. 
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∑∫      [     )      )]  
    
  
 
   
 
subject to inter-temporal budget constraint (4) and cash in advance constraint (5).  
Let    ) to be lagrange multiplier of budget constraint and  (    )) the lagrange 
multiplier of cash in advance constraint, the Lagrangean of problem stated above is: 
 (     )  (    )))  ∑ ∫  
         )
    )
 












     
    ) { ∑  (    ))
 
    
 (    )  )      )        )  ∫    )
 
 
   )   )     )   
∫    )
 
 
   )     ∑  (    )  ) [ 
 (    )  )   (    ))  ]
 
   }  
  (    )) { 
 (    )  )  ∫    )     )  
      )
    )
}  
For {[    )       ))}   
 
 the first order condition with respect to consumption      ), 
leisure      )         ), money holdings after a transfer   (    )  ) and timing for 
make transfer at      ) becomes respectively: 
|     )|:          )       )     ) )      (    ))    )           (7) 
|     )|:           )        )      )     ) )        )   )   )   )         (8) 
|  (    )  )|     ) (    )  )   (    ))             (9) 
|    )|   






[  (    )  ) (   













[  (    )  ) (   







   ) { ̇(    )  ) 
 (    )  )   (    )  ) ̇
 (    )  )   [ ̇(    )  ) (    ))  
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 ̇ (    )) (    )  )]   (    )) (    )) (    )) [ 
 (    )  )   
 (    )  )]  
      ))      ))}    (    )) [ 
 (    )  )   (    ))  
 (    )  )]  
 (      )) [ (    ))  
 (    )  )]                                      (10) 
Inserting condition (7) in the ratio between (5) and (6) we have the intratemporal 
condition between leisure and consumption, which is 
     )
      )
 
 (    )  )
   )   )
. Using (5), we 
get the growth rates of leisure and consumption during the holding periods, which are 




     )  
       )




   
       )
 .7 Thus consumption and 
leisure at moment   follow      )      ) 
         )) and      )      ) 
         )), with 
    ) and     ) are the positions of initial artificial consumption and leisure respectively 
in holding period. With this behavior of      ) and      ), and since 
      )  )
   )
 
         )), the intra-temporal condition between leisure and consumption, becomes: 
     ) 
         ))
    ) 
         ))
 
 
  (      ))   )
 
, for           (11) 
The condition (11) gives the position on consumption and leisure by household   over 
the holding period, which depends on their growths rates, nominal wages, interest rates, 
the preference for leisure and the distance to the previous transfer time. Even if the size 
of the holding period       )      ) is the same for all households, the hours of work 
supply decreases, and leisure increases within the holding period. The expression for the 
behavior of individual consumption and leisure of household   ) at moment   implies 
that aggregate consumption and aggregate leisure is respectively for         … 
                                                 
7
  The setting that I will use implies      and     . 
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   )  (      )      ))
  
∫      )  




   )  (      )      ))
  
∫      )  
       )     ))
 
. 
As referred above, for a complete holding period, all households which make a transfer 
at     ) starts with    for consumption and end with    
         )     )). The 
heterogeneity of model is in the timing of when transfers are made by households. At 
any moment  , the money demand of household     that make     transfers is 
     )  ∫    )     )  
      )
 
, for          . From now on, I will define the 
length of holding period as          )      ), which is the same for all households. 
The aggregate money demand at date   is    )    
  ∫      )  
  
 
. As individual 
consumption for            follows      )     
              )    , and    )  
   
   for   [        )), substituting in expression above of      ), the aggregate 
money demand at moment   is rewritten below: 
 
   )  
   )
     
 
  
    )     )
(      )    ))  
        ))  
    ))  
 
     )    
    )  
) (12) 
After rearranging (10), and using (11), the optimal interval between transfers,    yields 
from the positive root of 
 
  [
       )     ))  
   
    )
     )     ))  
    )      ))
]     )  (   
    )  )
    )  
(13) 
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The left side of (11) is the marginal cost of delaying the transfer and the right side of 
(11) is the marginal benefit of increasing  .    is the marginal benefit because 
households delays the payment of the transfer cost when    rises. When we divided (9) 
by  (    )  ) (    )) seems the term [ ̇(    )  )   ̇     )  )] , which is the same 
as [ (  )      )]  and means that the benefit of postponing the payment depends on 
the difference between nominal interest rate and inflation at   8 and financial cost. 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) point out that a large fraction of households only 
hold money because the left side is lower than the right side. 
2.4. Competitive equilibrium 
 
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of policies, allocations and prices such that (i) 
private agents (firms and households) solve their problems given the sequences of 
policies and prices, (ii) the budget constraints of the government is satisfied and (iii) all 
markets clear. Given a uniform distribution
9
, with density      the market clearing 
conditions implies that the money and bonds demanded by households is equal to the 
money and bounds supplied by government, i.e.,   





  ∫      )       )
  
 
. The labor and capital market clearing conditions are 
  
  
∫      )      )
  
 
 and   
  
∫      )      )
  
 
  Finally, the market clearing 
                                                 
8
 As we focus on steady state with constant nominal interest rate at   and inflation at   and with non-
arbitrage condition       an inter-temporal discount rate given by real interest rate in order to avoid 
the arbitrage opportunities between bonds and goods markets, i.e.,      . With this appears    
9
 A proof that the uniform distribution is the only distribution of agents compatible with a steady state in 
which agents have the same consumption pattern is in Grossman (1985, appendix B). 
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conditions for goods implies that the sum of aggregate private consumption, public 
consumption, financial services and aggregate investment equal the output production: 
 
   )    






  ̇  )      )
  (  










   
    ) 
(14) 
where the aggregate investment is the compensation of capital depreciated. 
2.5. Economy in Steady State 
 
The steady state is interpreted as the allocations and prices of an economy that has not 
been exposed to shocks for a long time, and so the evolution of inflation rate, nominal 
interest rate, aggregate consumption, aggregate capital and aggregate labor are 
independent of time. I also concentrated in a steady state equilibrium where the initial 
distribution of bonds, money and capital among the households is such that the 
economy of the model has properties that all holding periods, have the same duration, 
 , and all households behave similarly during their holding periods. Thus, all 
households readjust their portfolio in the same way, being equal the fraction of 
households that readjust their portfolio at any moment in this interval. This means, for 
example, the initially portfolio adjust is at date    )  [   ), and the posteriors 
readjusts are at dates    )    , for        . However, the proprieties of market 
segmentation are in the moment of transfer times, which are made at different times. 
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To ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium in steady state with bounded 
budget sets, there are two conditions that must be held in order to avoid arbitrage 
opportunities. The non-arbitrage condition between goods markets and asset markets 
which states the inter-temporal discount factor is such that compensates the returns of 
bounds and the growth rate of the single good price, or, in other , must be equal to the 
real interest rate, i.e.,       . Because only one asset is needed to accomplish all 
inter-temporal trades in a world without uncertainty, the second arbitrage condition 
ensures that capital and bonds have the equivalent rate of real return, i.e.,        
 . If the left side of the last condition is higher than the right side, the household can 
make its budget set unbounded by either buying an arbitrarily large capital, or in 
opposite case, selling capital short with an arbitrarily negative capital.  
At steady state equilibrium, the economy can be described by eight independent 
equilibrium static equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (9), (10), (11) and (12)
10
, which can be 
used to determine eight steady state equilibrium variables. For the experiments that I 
want to do, I choice as endogenous variables, the vector   [                  ], 
and the remaining variables of the model are parameters attributing it fixed values
11
. 
                                                 
10
 In appendix I rewrite the steady state equations. 
11
 In order to achieve the solution of the system of nonlinear equations, I build a program in MATLAB 
and use the function fmincon. The method
11
 adopted is generally referred to as constrained nonlinear 
optimization and, given an initial allocation for endogenous variables, it consists on minimizing an 
objective function subject to a system of nonlinear restrictions identified above. The objective function is 
a scalar function of the endogenous variables, and as the number on restrictions is equal to a number of 
variables to be determined, the objective function can be any constant, because it does not influence the 
values of   at steady state. Thus without loss consistency, I fix the objective function    )     . 
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3. Money Demand Instability and Financial Costs 
3.1. A Time-Series Construct for Financial Costs 
 
Since empirically it is extremely difficult to construct a direct measure of  , I will 
use indirect measures to create a time-series for   this will make it possible to posit the 
evolution. I construct a time-series for   through calibrating the model explained in the 
previous section, with annual time-series data of /  and   for the period 1900 to 2006. 
M1 is used for the monetary aggregate, , the nominal GDP for output,  , and short-
term commercial paper rate for the nominal interest rate
12
,  , as in Lucas (2000) and 
Wright (2005). For each annual period, the method adopted to achieve   consists in 
calibrating the nominal interest rate (r) with the values taken from the data, and   is 
calibrated in such a way that, in the general solution of the model, money-income ratio 
matches these values. 
In this exercise, for convenience, I assume there is no government and    . With this 
setting for  , the King, Plosser and Rebelo (1989)  utility function turns in logarithmic 
function  (     )      ))     (     ))              )), and has the propriety of 
separable leisure and consumption, and       and      on each holding period, 
i.e., consumption decreases at the nominal interest rate and leisure is constant. 
Moreover, in goods markets clearing condition (10) government expenditure term does 
not appear. I use a similar parameterization to that used by Silva (2012). In addition to 
calibration of parameters explained above, I calibrate the model for   = 3%,   = 2.065, 
  = 10% and    = 1. One important note is that the values of   that will be obtained are 
                                                 
12
Data sources are described in appendix. 
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not the real values of   because the model is constructed to explain the long-run money 
demand, when the economy is at its steady state. However, as we will see in the next 
subsection, the   created in this exercise can be seen as a very good proxy for real 
quantitative values of this variable, if we consider the financial costs as being the 
unexplained part of the money-income ratio. 
Figure 1plots the time series of financial costs and its trend retired by the Holdrick and 
Prescott (1997) filter. In general, as can be easily verified, the financial costs have 
followed a downward trend.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Portfolio Adjustment Cost 
 
The evolution has a minimum of 0.0008, a maximum of 0.018 and a mean of 0.007. We 
can interpret   as a fraction of income or as a cost per transfer. With per capita income 
of 35,000 dollars in 2000, that statistics means that the evolution of cost per transfer has 
a minimum of 28 dollars, a maximum of 630 dollars and a mean of 245 dollars.  If I 
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per transfer with a minimum of 0.292, a maximum of 6.57 and a mean of 2.56.
13
 And so 
have a minimum of about one third of day per transfer, a maximum of 6.57 days per 
transfer and a mean of about 2.56 days per transfer.   
An important observation needs to be made about the 1930s, which were characterized 
by the Great Depression and during which financial costs were very low. However, 
money demand was high due to an interest rate close to zero, making households feel 
less attracted to invest their income with very low return.  
3.2.  Money Demand Function with Financial Costs  
 
Using data from 1900 to 1994, Lucas (2000) relates the money-income ratio to the 
nominal interest rate, using  
         (15) 
where  >0 is a constant, and    measures the value of interest rate elasticity of money 
demand. Lucas (2000) preferred specifications set   = - 1/2, consistent with a shopping 
time model for money demand, and   is such that     matches the geometrical mean 
when   takes its geometrical mean.  
Teles and Zhou (2005) argue that M1 was a good measure of money before the 
development of the financial sector which started in the early 1980s. After that, they 
focus on MZM as the most appropriate measure for money demand, and the opportunity 
cost of holding money as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the 
interest for some components of MZM, like NOWs, MMDAs or MMMFS. The 
                                                 
13
 With this we can compare the values obtained with the values of Silva (2012). 
 































statistical used for this interest is the Three-month T-bill rate for secondary market. 
Hence they propose the following specification:  
           )  (16) 
Now, I will estimate the determinants of the money demand equation in (15) and (16) 









)             )    (15’) 
 
   (
   
 
̂
)               )       (16’) 
Thus the estimated interest rate elasticity for (15’) is  = - 0.31, and the estimated 
opportunity cost elasticity for (16’) is   = -0.29. The estimation of MZM/Y only began 
in the 1959 because sufficient was only then available. Figures 2 and 3 plot the 
logarithm of M1/Y and MZM/Y with the parameters showed above. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 If I estimate the MZM demand, only after 1980, the parameters will be the same as in Teles and Zhou 
(2005). 
Figure 2: Actual and Estimated M1/Y for 
1900-2006 
Figure 3: Actual and Estimated MZM/Y for 
1959-2006 
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In the money demand specification that I propose, I add to the counterpart money 
demand specification by Lucas (2000) the evolution created for  . Therefore, the money 
demand proposed in this study can be represented by  
           (17) 
where   is the financial costs elasticity of money demand.  The OLS estimators of (17) 
are in (17’), and imply that   = - 1/2 and   = 1/2. So, as reported by Silva (2012), the 
money demand in this model is similar to a Baumol-Tobin money demand, i.e., 
     √   . According to Lucas (2000), this specification has a good fit to the U.S. 
data.  
 




)           )          )      (17’) 
In figure 4, it can easily be seen that with the time-series created for  , the money 
demand estimated gives a very good explanation of the logarithmic of M1-income ratio. 
It describes the general pattern of the data much better than the other specifications of 
money demand. 
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This research suggests that   may be important in explaining the instability of money 
demand. This way, it is important to identify the determinants of  , and, in particular, if 
changes in   match the alterations in US financial laws. 
In the next chapter, I will provide a brief review of post 1980 development in the 
financial sector of the United States, and check, with a new calibration of the model, if 
  is lower since that date, and I will quantify the welfare effects. With this I also 
provide robustness to the exercise make in this chapter. 
 
4. Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation and Financial 
Deregulation 
Have financial innovation and financial deregulation make lower  ? As in the previous 
section, this question is examined trough calibrating the model with time-series data of 
 /  and   for the period 1900 to 2006. However, the method adopted to achieve   is 
different and consists in the following steps. In the first place, the available data is 
divided into two samples. The first sample takes in the period between 1900 and 1979 
and the second sample goes from 1980 to 2006. The second sample has the particularity 
to covers the period of financial deregulation and the occurrence of major financial 
innovations. For both periods, the data used is the same as the previous exercise in this 
Dissertation. In the second place, for each sample, is computed the US historical 
geometrical mean for money-income ratio (m/Y), along with nominal interest rate (r). 
Finally, for each sample, I assume the US historical geometrical mean to calibrate the 
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nominal interest rate (r), and   is determined in such a way that in a general solution of 
the model, money-income ratio (m/Y) taken US historical geometrical mean. In the first 
subsection, I will provide a brief review of the post 1980 era in the financial sector of 
the United States. 
4.1. Financial Innovation and Financial Deregulation in the USA 
(post 1980) 
The beginning of financial deregulation started with enactment of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which abolished most of 
the interest ceilings imposed on deposit accounts. From then on, a number of major 
deregulation acts have been passed. They included: the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Improvement Act of 1991, which introduced some risk sensitivity to deposit insurance 
premiums, and the Neal-Riegle Interstate Banking Act of 1994, which created financial 
holding companies, and ended the artificial separation of insurance companies and 
commercial and investment banks. 
Along with numerous financial innovations, powered by the rapid improvements in data 
processing and telecommunications, the deregulation of the financial sector also created 
an increasing competition in the banking industry. The development of Internet 
banking, electronic payments, and information exchanges appear as the biggest financial 
innovations. ATMs, for instance, grew steadily during the early- to mid-1980's. The 
adoption of new cash management techniques, along with increasing competition 
among commercial banks is likely to have brought about considerable benefits to 
consumers and reduced the costs of money transactions. 
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4.2. Welfare 
The Welfare of this kind of economy is given by the steady state aggregate 
intertemporal utility from all households, each with equal weight, for the steady state 
nominal interest rate, and for financial costs of participation. Formally, we have:  
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 which can be rewritten as: 
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In (17), I write      ) to emphasize the role of most important factors that influence 
the holding period. In this experiment, the effects on welfare are present in  . Silva 
(2009) proves that 
  
  
   and 
  
  
  .  
The welfare compensation is defined as the amount of additional income that 
households should receive in a given situation to ensure the same level of aggregate 
utility in another situation. Let         ) denote the steady state intertemporal utility 
for all households when each household receives compensation   and all remaining 
equilibrium variables are set at their steady state values under the fixed cost   and  . Let 
 ̅ and  ̅ be respectively the higher financial costs and the lower interest rate and what 
needs to be found is I need to know how much consumers would need to be 
compensated to be as well as after the financial costs decrease to   and increase  ̅ to r. If 
compensation is negative, thus the second situation provides benefits in welfare in the 
economy of this model. The compensation that makes the households indifferent 
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between (   ) and   ̅  ̅) is an exogenous transfer      to each household, of an extra 
flow of real income such that it solves  ( ̅  ̅     )         ), i.e., 
      
  (     ))
  
 
         ))




   ̅  ̅) 




  (   ̅  ̅))
  
 
         ))
 (  
 
 )     ) 
     )      ))   ̅  ̅)(  
 
 )
   (18) 
In the economy with variables ( ̅  ̅     ) the market clearing condition is 





   
         (19) 
Now I have a new system of equilibrium allocations, where I add one more variable 
    , one more equation (18) and the equation (14) exchanged by (19) to the previous 
system of equations.  As the number of equations is equal to the number of endogenous 
variables, the new system of equations can be solved and the value of      associated 
with the sample characterized by financial innovation and deregulation can be 
determined. 
4.3.  Calibration 
 
The most important variable in this experiment is  , which is determined in such a way 
that    )    ̅  ̅) is verified for each sample, where  ̅ and  ̅ are the US historical 
geometrical means of money income ratio and nominal interest rate respectively. This 
method is similar to that followed by Lucas (2000) and Silva (2012) for M1, and 
Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas (2007) for the average of M2 velocity. The 
mean interest rate during the first sample  ̅ is 3.13% percent per year and the mean of 
money income ratio ̅   is 0.28. For the second sample  ̅ = 5.54% and ̅   = 0.15. 
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The parameterization adopted for the two samples in this experiment is shown in the 
table below: 
Table I: Parameter values 
                   
First 
Sample 
3 1.5 0.189 2.9195 10% 0.33 3.13% -0.5% 3.64% 
Second 
Sample 
- - - 2.9198 - - 6.36% 2.72% - 
 
The relative risk aversion parameter was set equal to 3. This assumption is consistent 
with the empirical evidence presented by Hall (1988), who suggests that the inverse of 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,    , is much less than one. In addition, the 
seminal work of Mehra and Prescott (1985) states that the estimates of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution are usually below 10. Silva (2012) also argues that the values 
of   above 10 only match the data with exogenous segmentation. Cooley and Hansen 
(1989) and Cooley and Hansen (1991) set    . 
The depreciation rate   is set to 10% so that the investment share in total output is close 
to 30%. I set   
 =0 because it is not optimal for the government to have initial debt 
higher than zero in steady state. Government expenditure was set close to 22% of the 
total output in each sample. The Lump Sum Tax is set so that it compensates 
seignoriage in financing government expenditures.  
For convenience, the preference for leisure   was left to be determined in the model and 
the equilibrium value of   was set to be close to 30% of the total time available for 
hours of work. In this way, I let varying the growth rate for consumption and leisure 
with an additional parameter in each sample. For the share of capital income in total 
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income I set  =1/3, the same value used by Cooley and Hansen (1989), and Cooley and 
Hansen (1989). It was also assumed that  =1.5. Finally, I set   = 3.64%, and the 
inflation rate   is given by non-arbitrage condition between goods market and bonds 
market
15
,    . 
4.4. Results and Comments 
The results from the first experiment are summarized in Table 2. The lower   in the 
second sample suggests that   is a good measure of the financial development in the 
second sample. With a higher interest rate, which implies higher inflation (  increases 
about 3.23% in the second sample), the results are surprising due to lower financial 
costs in second sample.  In general a situation with higher interest rate is worse for 
welfare. For instance the interest rate can be seen as a “tax of holding money”. 
Additionally, a situation with lower   , also can be worse to welfare. As we assume that 
over the century only two parameters change, these results occur because in the model, 
households can choose the timing for when to use financial services. The change in   is 
relatively higher than the change in  , and then     decreases.  
For 1900-1979,   which makes       )       is 0.0117 and the optimal time interval 
between visits to financial markets is 1.3 per year, which means that households spend 
about 20 minutes per week on financial transactions. For 1980-2006, then   which 
                                                 
15
 I could let   takes its geometrical mean, and   is given by the difference between r and  . However this 
would imply a   very low. Typically, annual   assumes values close to three.  
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makes       )       is 0.0057 and the optimal   = 0.68 year, and so the time 
devoted to financial transfers is about 19 minutes per week.
16
 
Table II: Steady State Values in each Sample for first experiment 
 
My interpretation for the results of this experiment is that financial innovations, not only 
increases the participation in financial markets, but at the same time decrease the time 
that households devoted to financial services. As households can readjust, the timing to 
readjust their portfolio, and the net loss from making a transfer decreases with nominal 
interest rate and financial cost, households increase their participation in financial 
markets.     
                                                 
16
 According to the OECD, the average weekly hours of U workers from 1957 to 197 is equal to 36.5. So 
the time spent on financial services is given by 
 
 
        . 
 1900-1979 1980-2006 
   0.4508 0.4511 
  1.2932 0.68 
  0.0117 0.0057 
  0.3 0.3 
  0.849 0.849 
  2.0541 2.0541 
  0.3058 0.3053 
    0.28 0.15 
   0.0129 0.0225 
   -0.0183 -0.0319 
C 0.4456 0.4623 
     -0.1%  
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The results also show the empirical evidence found by McCandless and Weber (1995), 
in which inflation and output are not correlated in the long run.
17
  
In the second sample, the initial consumption increases by 0.07%, and the negative 
growth rate of consumption within holding periods increases 74.16% and as referred, 
the length of the holding period decreases by 47.4%. As a result, aggregate consumption 
increases by 3.74%. As the increase in frequency of transfers is lower than the decrease 
in financial costs, under market clearing conditions of goods and for the same output, 
this situation requires a transfer in the use of resources in the financial services     to 
aggregate consumption in output composition, i.e., the share of financial service is 
lower in output and the share of aggregate consumption is higher in output composition 
for the second sample, which is illustrated in table 3. 








1900-79 52.47% 1,07% 22% 24.46% 
1980-06 52.56% 0.98% 22% 24.46% 
 
In addition, to compensate for the increase in resources available for consumption, 
households cut working hours. As households are working less, they have more time 
available for leisure and this increases utility. As aggregate consumption and aggregate 
leisure increase, there is a decrease in output produced by financial sector, which does 
not change the aggregate utility, the welfare is higher in the second sample. Figure 5 
below illustrates the behavior of consumption in each steady state.  
                                                 
17
 On the other side, Cooley and Hansen (1989) report evidence of a negative correlation between 
inflation and output. 
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Figure 5 Artificial Consumption and leisure in each Steady State: x axes represents the 
periods, and y axes gives the position of artificial consumption for each period. I divide the annualized 
variables per 365 in order to obtain   in days. The evolution with color red is for first sample, and with 
color blue is for second sample. The discontinued line represents the end of holding period and the timing 
of households makes a transfer from brokerage account to bank account.  
 
 
We can conclude that, as   decreases in the sample characterized by financial 
innovation and financial deregulation,   in this model can be a good proxy for 
understanding financial development. In addition, a reduction in  , or an increase in 
financial development, provides benefits to social welfare, and more than offsets the 
welfare cost of higher interest rate.  
In order to quantify the benefits,      = - 0.1% of income means that the benefits of 
financial development is already 10 billion dollars in US nominal GDP of 2000.  
5. Conclusions 
 
This Dissertation researched one empirical application of a Baumol-Tobin model with 
market segmentation. The financial costs ( ), faced by households when they use 
financial services, is important to explain the instability of money demand. I use the 
model with same particularities of Silva (2012), and I compute the time-series of these 
costs. I find that   has seen a downward trend over the last century. Moreover, I add the 
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new time series computed to the specification of money demand à la Lucas (2000), and 
the M1 money demand empowered a precise characterization of annual U.S. data during 
the period 1900-2006. The OLS estimates for elasticity of money demand counterpart 
that I propose are 0.5 for financial costs and -0.5 for interest rate. As my model is 
constructed to study the long run when economy is at steady state, the values of   time-
series are not the real values for  , but is a very good proxy.  
A stable estimate of money demand is an important tool for performing the objective of 
a monetary authority to provide elastic liquidity at stable prices (Teles and Zhou, 2005).  
Finally, I divide the available data in to two samples, and I study the welfare effects on 
a sample characterized by a higher interest rate and substantially lower   due to 
financial innovations and financial deregulation. Generally a higher nominal interest 
rate decreases the welfare. However, when the financial costs decrease, they provide 
benefits in such way that overcompensate the welfare costs of higher interest rates. A 
policy implication is that, as the fixed cost decreases over time, due to financial 
innovations, the welfare cost of inflation driven by a higher interest rate will can be 
affected.  
This research suggests that   can be important to explain the instability of money 
demand. This way, it will be important to identify the determinants of  , and model it in 
order to have a stable estimate of  . I leave this topic for future research. 
Additionally, in this study,   matches the alterations in the U.S financial laws with a 









From 1900 to 1997, all data series for M1, GDP and nominal interest rate is the same as 
used in Lucas (2000). After 1997 all the data are taken from the US Federal Reserve 
Bank’s web-site: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
For M1 (billions of Dollars, December of each year):   
 From 1900 to 1913: Historical Statistics of the United States (1960), Series X-
267: Demand deposits adjusted plus currency outside banks;  
 From 1924 to 1958: Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Table A-1, pp. 704-734, 
column 7 (sum of currency and demand deposits). December, Seasonally 
Adjusted; 
 From 1959 to 2006: FRED M1 December, Seasonally Adjusted Series, M1SL 
(Billions of Dollars).  
For income I use the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP):   
 From 1900 to 1928: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1970. Author: Bureau of the Census (1975). Series F1 (NGDP). (Billions of 
dollars)  
 From 1929 to 1997: NIPA. Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product. (Billions of 
dollars)  
For the interest rate I use commercial paper rate expressed in annual percentage: 
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 From 1900to1975: Friedman and Schwartz 1982, Table 4.8, column 6, p. 122, 
"Monetary trends in the U.S. and the U.K., 1875-1975," University of Chicago 
Press.; 
 From 1976 to 1997: Economic Report of the President (1996, Table B-73 "Bond 
Yields and Interest rates"). 
 
A.2. Steady State Equations Rewritten 
 
Now it is dropped the index   and   from the notation for simplify. The equations of 
steady state are: 
The production function 
          
The demand for capital 
  
  
    )
 
The aggregate supply of hours by households 
         )  
      
   
 
The government budget constraint 
          
  







      






   
   
Equation for optimal length of transfer times 
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The real aggregate money demand 
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Labor demand 







A.3. Time Series for Financial Costs 
 
Year   Year   Year   Year    
1900 0,011753 1933 0,005877 1966 0,007438 1999 0,003584  
1901 0,012384 1934 0,00271 1967 0,006597 2000 0,004142  
1902 0,012737 1935 0,002625 1968 0,007329 2001 0,00246  
1903 0,016918 1936 0,002618 1969 0,009392 2002 0,001251  
1904 0,014022 1937 0,002986 1970 0,008953 2003 0,000799  
1905 0,015088 1938 0,003036 1971 0,005679 2004 0,001185  
1906 0,017 1939 0,003017 1972 0,00494 2005 0,002584  
1907 0,018137 1940 0,003336 1973 0,008014 2006 0,003521  
1908 0,013447 1941 0,002651 1974 0,009104    
1909 0,009775 1942 0,002262 1975 0,005282    
1910 0,012795 1943 0,002727 1976 0,003997    
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1911 0,010507 1944 0,003179 1977 0,003932    
1912 0,01157 1945 0,004181 1978 0,005164    
1913 0,012658 1946 0,005247 1979 0,006589    
1914 0,013948 1947 0,00574 1980 0,007101    
1915 0,010238 1948 0,006677 1981 0,007849    
1916 0,008526 1949 0,00686 1982 0,006603    
1917 0,011096 1950 0,005822 1983 0,005118    
1918 0,01051 1951 0,007137 1984 0,005425    
1919 0,012033 1952 0,007644 1985 0,004438    
1920 0,015378 1953 0,007756 1986 0,004027    
1921 0,016123 1954 0,004964 1987 0,004778    
1922 0,011003 1955 0,006156 1988 0,005027    
1923 0,010244 1956 0,008663 1989 0,005085    
1924 0,008219 1957 0,009088 1990 0,0044    
1925 0,009145 1958 0,005805 1991 0,003389    
1926 0,008784 1959 0,008682 1992 0,002479    
1927 0,00854 1960 0,007767 1993 0,00243    
1928 0,010151 1961 0,005792 1994 0,003696    
1929 0,010945 1962 0,005773 1995 0,004173    
1930 0,008036 1963 0,006 1996 0,003737    
1931 0,007405 1964 0,006274 1997 0,003827    
1932 0,010008 1965 0,006416 1998 0,003712    
 
Note: Years in Bold. If we multiply the values of financial costs by 365, we have familiar values that 
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